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THE SITUATION IS familiar to every human resource employee in
the country and repeated daily in all types of industries. An employer
has decided to hire a new employee and wishes to avoid a costly jury
trial should the employment relationship go sour. The general coun-
sel's office offers the perfect solution: Before he is employed, have the
employee sign an agreement requiring any dispute be submitted to
binding arbitration. Costs are reduced and the dispute will be resolved
more quickly. Once the interview and application process is over, the
employee is trotted down to the human resources department to fill
out the paperwork before he starts the job.
In addition to the usual payroll paperwork, a strange piece of pa-
per is placed before the prospective employee entitled "Pre-Employ-
ment Contract." The employee is told that this document must be
signed or the offer of employment will be withdrawn. Amongst the
trade secret and the drug screening clauses is a clause that requires
the employee to submit any employment dispute to binding arbitra-
tion.' The employee signs, and begins working for the employer, but
later, the employment relationship sours-either the employee per-
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1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining arbitration as "A method of
dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are [usually] agreed to
by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.").
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ceives harassment and brings suit, or he is terminated. The employee
consults an attorney regarding filing suit. Perhaps unaware of the arbi-
tration provision, the attorney files suit in state or federal court seek-
ing relief. The employer moves to dismiss, based on the existence of
the signed agreement requiring arbitration; the judge must then de-
cide whether to enforce the agreement.
Much has been written recently regarding the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements and pre-em-
ployment contracts. The plaintiffs bar seeks to invalidate the clauses,
while employers seek enforcement. Until recently, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals sided with plaintiffs, holding that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA") does not apply to employment contracts. 2 The
Ninth Circuit had also held that civil rights claims brought under Tide
VIIP for discrimination in employment cannot be subject to
mandatory arbitration. 4
The validity of mandatory arbitration clauses, where the dispute
involves state and federal civil rights, as well as any legal rights under
the pre-employment contract, has been extensively litigated.5 The re-
sult is a split in authority, with the majority of federal circuit courts of
appeal6 and the California Supreme Court holding that they are en-
forceable. 7 The Ninth Circuit has held that Congress did not intend
that Title VI claims be subject to compulsory arbitration. 9 As the his-
tory of arbitration agreements has been extensively covered, this Note
examines recent changes in the law and elaborates on the California
Supreme Court's position on arbitration agreements.10
2. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the FAA does not apply to labor or employment contracts).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin).
4. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
5. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
6. See Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (lth Cir. 1992)
(holding that arbitration agreements are enforceable).
7. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, 699 (Cal. 2000).
8. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).
9. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
10. See, e.g., Shane Anderies, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Individual Employ-
ment Contracts After Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.: A Note on Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 765 (2000) (extensively covering the history
of mandatory arbitration in California leading up to the present decision).
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This Note examines both the minimum requirements for draft-
ing and enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements and the argu-
ments for and against each of these requirements. Part I of this Note
gives a brief background of the issues involved and the cases leading
up to the California Supreme Court's decision in Armendariz. Part II
addresses the Armendariz case in detail and examines the requirements
that the court has set forth. Part III deals with the effects of this deci-
sion on employers who have existing agreements and on plaintiffs
who choose to bring actions against their employers. This Note con-
cludes that the California Supreme Court was correct in upholding
these provisions, but proposes that the court, by sidestepping too
many important issues, did not go far enough.
I. Background
The first United States Supreme Court case to examine the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements was Alexander v. Gardner-Denver'
in which the Court rejected a mandatory arbitration clause contained
in a collective bargaining agreement and allowed the plaintiff to pur-
sue judicial relief.12 The Court subsequently altered the employment
arbitration landscape in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 13 hold-
ing that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act 14 was subject to mandatory arbitration. 15 There the issue was
not one of collective bargaining, but instead involved an individual
pre-employment contract signed as a condition of employment in the
securities industry.16
A. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens, Co.: The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Precludes the Enforcement of Mandatory Arbitration in
Title VII Claims
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the dis-
trict court's decision compelling arbitration in a Title VII and Fair
Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") claim in Duffield.17 Duffield,
interpreting Gilmer, had created a circuit split with the majority of
11. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
12. See id. at 59-60.
13. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
15. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
16. See id.
17. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
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courts aligned against the Ninth Circuit.18 Tonya Duffield was a bro-
ker-dealer in the securities industry who was required to sign a pre-
employment arbitration agreement which included an arbitration
clause. 19 In a groundbreaking decision, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Civil Rights Act of 199120 precludes the mandatory arbitration of
Title VII claims. 2 1
While this decision has not been expressly overturned, the
United States Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair
Adams22 has certainly fired a warning shot across the bow. 23 In Circuit
City Stores, Inc., the Court felt that the intent of Congress was that em-
ployment agreements are to be covered under the Federal Arbitration
Act.2 4 By overturning the Ninth Circuit's earlier holding that the FAA
does not apply to employment contracts, 25 the Court appears to have
made its position known.
B. Cole v. Burns International Security Services: Factors Required in
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued an opin-
ion which helped form the basis for the California Supreme Court's
holding in Armendariz. In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,26
The court of appeals created a framework for evaluating arbitration
agreements. The court read Gilmer as "requiring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements that do not undermine the relevant statutory
scheme."2 7 The court in Cole first determined that the only agree-
ments that fall outside of the FAA are those that cover workers in-
volved directly in the movement of goods in interstate commerce. 2
The court then expounded on five factors necessarily present before a
clause is deemed valid:
[T] he arbitration arrangement (1) provides for neutral arbitrators,
(2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a writ-
ten award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would oth-
18. See supra note 6 discussing the majority view.
19. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1996).
21. See Duffield, 144 F.3d. at 1190 n.7.
22. No. 99-1379, 2001 U.S. Lexis 2459 (Mar. 21, 2001).
23. See id. (holding that the FAA applies to all employment contracts including collec-
tive bargaining agreements).
24. See id.
25. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
27. Id. at 1468.
28. See id. at 1472.
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erwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as
a condition of access to the arbitration forum. 29
Prior to Armendariz, the state courts had to review conflicting fed-
eral and state law to determine whether to uphold arbitration clauses
in employment contracts. The California Supreme Court provided
some guidelines for the lower courts to follow.
I. The Case
A. Parties
Marybeth Armendariz and Dolores Olague-Rodgers ("Plaintiffs")
were formerly employed as supervisors in the Provider Relations
Group at Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. ("Defendant").30
On June 20, 1996, Plaintiffs were informed that their positions were
being eliminated and that they were being terminated. 31 They subse-
quently filed a complaint for wrongful termination against Defendant
in a superior court.3 2 The Plaintiffs alleged that they had been termi-
nated after a year of sexual harassment by their same sex coworkers
and supervisor.33 The basis of their complaint was that they were ter-
minated in violation of the FEHA for being heterosexual.3 4 Both
Plaintiffs had filled out and signed employment application forms
which included a clause requiring arbitration of all wrongful termina-
tion claims.35 The agreement also limited damages to wages which
would have been earned from the date of the termination until the
date of the arbitration award and denied any other remedy at law or
in equity.36
B. Procedural Posture
After receiving the initial complaint, Defendant responded by fil-
ing a motion to compel arbitration. 37 The trial court denied the mo-
29. Id. at 1482.
30. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal.
2000).
31. See id. at 675.
32. See id. at 674.
33. See id. at 675.
34. See id.; see also Fair Employment and Housing Act (codified as CAL. GoV. CODE
§ 12920) (West 1992) (listing among the characteristics singled out for protection: "sexual
orientation").
35. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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tion on the grounds that the arbitration provision was an "adhesion
contract"38 and that the provisions were such that they shocked the
conscience. 39 The court focused specifically on the requirement that
the employees arbitrate their claims, but not the employer; it also fo-
cused on the limitation of damages and remedies. 4° The Defendant
appealed the decision.4'
The court of appeal reversed the lower court decision,42 deter-
mining that the contract was one of adhesion and the damages provi-
sion was unconscionable and contrary to public policy.43 The court of
appeal did hold that the arbitration agreement itself was valid and
severed the offending damages provision. 44 Subsequently, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court granted review to address the issue of whether
employers may enforce mandatory arbitration agreements. 45
C. The California Supreme Court Decision
The California Supreme Court first found the agreement be-
tween Foundation and the employees to be unconscionable, allowing
the employees to bring their claim before a jury.46 The court pro-
ceeded to address the issue of mandatory arbitration and implicitly
held that such agreements are nevertheless enforceable if they meet
the criteria established in Cole.47 As a result, the court's opinion has
served as a road map of rules for employers to follow in creating valid
arbitration clauses. At the time, the California Supreme Court, in re-
jecting Duffield, also created incentives for employees to engage in fo-
rum shopping when bringing Title VII and corresponding FEHA
claims.
38. See Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 785 (1961) (defining a contract
of adhesion as "a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of supe-
rior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere
to the contract or reject it.").
39. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Armendariz, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
43. See id. at 263.
44. See id. at 268.
45. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 676.
46. See id.
47. See id. (discussing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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1. Majority Opinion
a. Applicability of the FAA to Employment Contracts
The first issue before the California Supreme Court was whether
the FAA would apply to employment contracts. 48 Rather than resolve
the issue, the court chose not to decide the matter. 49 Instead, the
court decided to distinguish Duffield based on differences between the
Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act 50 ("CAA").
Noting that the FEHA contains no prohibition against the use of
mandatory arbitration, the court turned to whether the contract was
unconscionable or against public policy.51 This issue, however, was re-
cently resolved. The United States Supreme Court in Circuit City
Stores52 recently held that employment contracts are covered under
the FAA unless they involve the specific exemptions contained
therein.53
b. Notice
The second issue argued by the Plaintiffs and passed on by the
court, was the level of notice required in an arbitration agreement to
waive civil rights claims. 54 Plaintiffs contended that the clause only ap-
plied to contractual rights and that they had not been given clear no-
tice that their rights under FEHA, or any other statutory framework,
were also subject to compulsory arbitration. 55 The court noted that
the Ninth Circuit had held mandatory arbitration clauses to be unen-
forceable unless the clause expressly put the employees on notice that
their statutory claims are included.56 The court declined to decide this
issue because the employees failed to petition for review on this
issue.57
48. See id. at 678.
49. See id.
50. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (West 1982) (defining "Agreement" under the
CAA as "[including] but is not limited to agreements providing for valuations, appraisals
and similar proceedings and agreements between employers and employees."). But see 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1997) (stating, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce").
51. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680.
52. No. 99-1379, 2001 U.S. Lexis 2459.
53. See id.
54. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680 n.7.
55. See id.
56. See Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
57. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680 n.7.
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2. Requirements for a Valid Agreement
Next the court used contract principles to decide whether the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.5 8 The court began: "as-
suming an adequate arbitral forum, we agree with the Supreme Court
a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute. '59
a. Limitation of Remedies
Among the first issues addressed by the California Supreme
Court in Armendariz was the principle that an arbitration agreement
cannot contain a limitation of remedies, 60 noting that the purpose of
the FEHA was to address discrimination. 61 Elaborating on its reason-
ing, the court stated: "It is indisputable that an employment contract
that required employees to waive their rights under the FEHA to re-
dress sexual harassment or discrimination would be contrary to public
policy and unlawful. '62 Thus, "[i]n light of these principles, it is evi-
dent that an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehi-
cle for the waiver of statutory rights. 6 3
The court based its finding, that the limitation of damages provi-
sion unconscionable, in part on its prior decision in Broughton v.
CIGNA Health Plans of California.64 In Broughton, the court examined a
claim brought under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act,65 which in-
cludes a provision for "permanent injunctive relief to enjoin deceptive
business practices. ' 66 The court concluded "such a remedy is beyond
the scope of an arbitrator to grant or properly enforce. '67 Thus, an
agreement to arbitrate cannot contain a provision that would limit
statutory remedies. The Broughton court also noted that where an
agreement contained limitations on punitive damages and attorneys'
fees, that agreement is also unlawful. 68 So, under Armendariz there is a
58. See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982) (finding that
there are two different elements of unconscionability: the first element is procedural and
focuses on whether there was oppression or surprise; the second element is substantive and
focuses on the terms of the agreement. Both need to be satisfied, though not equally.).
59. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
60. See id.
61. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1990).
62. Arnendariz, 6 P.3d at 681.
63. Id.
64. 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
65. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1750 (West 1998).
66. Broughton, 988 P.2d at 71.
67. Id.
68. See Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
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requirement that any agreement cannot limit an employee's statutory
damages 69-this includes punitive damages.70 The court also found
that the contract provision limiting damages to salary up to the time
of arbitration and denying equitable relief was unconscionable. 71
b. Adequate Discovery
The court next looked at how the employee's rights may be safe-
guarded where the employer is often in control of the necessary docu-
ments.7 2 The Defendants argued that their agreement was valid
because it had incorporated all of the rules of the CAA.73 The CAA
contains a provision allowing for depositions and discovery for civil
cases as if the claim was brought before a court.7 4 The court did note
that parties could agree to something less than the full range of dis-
covery, but such an agreement must be express. 75 Otherwise, "when
parties agree to arbitrate statutory claims, they also implicitly agree,
absent express language to the contrary, to such procedures as are
necessary to vindicate that claim."' 76 Even if the parties are not entitled
to the full range of discovery under the CAA, "they are at least entitled
to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, in-
cluding access to essential documents and witnesses. 77
c. Written Arbitration Award to Allow Judicial Review
The court next addressed the requirement that the arbitrator is-
sue an award in writing that "will reveal, however briefly, the essential
findings and conclusions on which the award is based. '78 The Plain-
tiffs argued that the court's decision in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase79
69. This Note does not address whether an employer can limit contract damages.
70. See Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 649 P.2d 912, 918
(Cal. 1982).




74. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.05(a) (West Supp. 2000) (allowing for such dis-
covery unless the dispute is a "limited civil case").
75. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 685.
79. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992). In Moncharsh, the California Supreme Court overturned
the common law rule that an arbitrator's award could be vacated if there was an error on
the face of the award and it would cause substantial injustice. See id. The court determined
that this was contrary to public policy, but in dicta said that an award could be subject to
judicial review if it was inconsistent with a party's statutory rights. See id.
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rendered this point moot, as review would provide plaintiffs with no
protection.80 In Moncharsh, the California Supreme Court held that
even an award that is "erroneous on its face and will cause substantial
injustice" is not subject to judicial review. 81 Plaintiffs contended that
even if an award contained a significant error of law that would cause
substantial injustice, there was nothing the court could do.82 The
court even admits that mistakes will happen, but accepts that the ben-
efit of allowing parties to bypass the judicial system and obtain a
speedy decision outweighs the potential harm.8 3 The Armendariz court
did not address what standard of review was necessary to comply with
the statute and avoided the issue as the court was not faced with a
petition to confirm an award.8 4 The court chose instead to rely on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon,8 5 in which the Court held that judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards was proper to ensure that arbitrators comply with
the statute.86 Thus, the court merely held that an arbitrator in a FEHA
claim must issue a written arbitration decision to allow for judicial
review. 87
d. Neutral Arbitrator
Plaintiffs did not contest the neutrality of the arbitrator involved
in their case.88 However, this is an issue that requires the attention of
any attorney drafting such an agreement. The California Supreme
Court stated, prior to the Armendariz case, that the use of a neutral
arbitrator is essential to the integrity of the arbitration process.8 9
There are remedies where an arbitration agreement contains a provi-
sion which allows for the use of a biased or pre-selected arbitrator. 90
The court would likely sever that portion of the agreement.91 A good
example of a well written arbitration clause can be found in Little v.
80. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684-85.
81. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 919 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 904.
84. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684-85.
85. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
86. See id. at 232.
87. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685.
88. See id. at 682.
89. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 167 (Cal. 1981).
90. Examples of biased or pre-selected arbitrators include: when the employer forces
the employee to arbitrate the dispute with a law firm it has on retainer; the human re-
sources director of an affiliate; or even a single arbitrator known for a defensive bias.
91. See id.
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Auto Steigler, Inc.,9 2 a recent case upholding a mandatory arbitration
clause. 93
e. Costs Must Be Paid by the Employer
The next argument addressed by the Armendariz court involved
the apportioning of the costs of arbitration in FEHA cases.94 The
Plaintiffs argued that the requirement that they share the costs of arbi-
tration, 95 which are often substantial, 96 posed an undue burden on
their ability to seek redress of their claims.97 The court determined
that "when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition
of employment, the arbitration agreement . . .cannot generally re-
quire the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee
would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the
action in court."98 The court rested its decision on the potentially chil-
ling effect large costs would have on plaintiffs' exercise of their consti-
tutional rights99-an employee who is unable or unwilling to foot the
high forum costs would be precluded from obtaining relief.100 The
Armendariz court felt that requiring the employer to bear the costs was
fair, as the party requiring mandatory arbitration is the one who bears
the costs of such arbitration. 10 1 The court specifically stated that in
order for arbitration to be compelled "[there must be] specific provi-
sions on arbitration costs."1 0 2 Forcing employees to pay arbitration
costs was also disfavored, even when the employer prevails. 10 3 Thus,
the Armendariz court felt that the risk that an employee would not
92. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 58 (2001) (providing that the arbitrator was to be a retired
superior court judge and would be subject to disqualification for the same reasons as a
judge of that court).
93. See id. at 58.
94. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684-85 (Cal.
2000).
95. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1284.2 (West 1982) (providing that "each party to the
arbitration shall pay his pro rata share of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator.").
96. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685.
97. See id. at 685.
98. Id. at 687.
99. See id.
100. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
101. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, 686 (Cal. 2000) (citing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
102. Id. at 679.
103. See generally Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. California, 975 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1999) (holding it
is not constitutionally permissible to require a teacher who lost an administrative proce-
dure to pay one half of the Administrative Law Judge fees).
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bring a claim to vindicate his statutory rights for fear of a substantial
costs would chill those rights.10 4
f. Agreements Must Require That Both Parties Submit to
Arbitration
The court next looked at the contract to determine if the con-
tract, or any part of it, was unconscionable. 10 5 The court did not re-
strict this particular ruling to the arbitration of statutory claims, but
held that it applies to all claims where mandatory arbitration is re-
quired as a condition of employment.1 0 6 The first part of the analysis
used by the court was to determine whether the contract was one of
adhesion. 10 7 After determining that the agreement was a contract of
adhesion, the court looked at whether it should be enforced against
the employees.108
The Plaintiffs argued, relying on Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,109 that
because the contract required only the employees to submit to arbitra-
tion, it should be held unconscionable. The court upheld the court of
appeals decision in Stirlen requiring that an arbitration agreement
must provide a "modicum of bilaterality,"110 reasoning that "[if] the
arbitration system established by the employer is indeed fair, the em-
ployer ... should be willing to submit claims to arbitration."1''  The
exception is if the employer has "at least some reasonable justification
for such one-sidedness based on business realities."112 The court con-
cluded, "the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which a
stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbi-
tration forum on the weaker party without accepting that forum for
itself."113
3. Severability of Provisions
Defendant argued that even if some of the provisions of its con-
tract were unconscionable, the court should sever those provisions,
104. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 687.
105. See id. at 688.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id at 690-91.
109. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1st Dist. 1997).
110. Armendaiz, 6 P.3d at 679.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 699.
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but leave the agreement intact.114 The court first examined the Cali-
fornia Civil Code to determine the available options. Section
1670.5(a) 115 allows the court to either sever the offending provision
or refuse to enforce the contract 16 and section 1598117 allows for the
voiding of an entire contract if its purpose is unlawful.' 18 The court
concluded that because the contract contained both an unlawful uni-
lateral arbitration agreement and an unlawful limitation of damages
provision, the contract was permeated by an unlawful purpose. 19 The
Armendariz court concluded that, unlike a potentially severable clause
limiting damages, a contract that has a lack of mutuality cannot be
cured by severance; instead, it can only be cured by reformation 20
and there is no statute contained in the CAA that would allow the
reformation of the contract at issue.' 2 '
4. Justice Brown's Concurring Opinion
Justice Brown wrote separately to disagree with the majority solely
on the issue of apportioning the costs of arbitration.122 Justice Brown
felt the most equitable way to apportion these costs was to allow the
arbitrator to apportion the costs among the parties.' 23 Her plan would
neither require the employee to pay any of the costs up front nor pay
a certain share.' 24 Instead, "the arbitrator should consider the magni-
tude of the costs unique to arbitration, the ability of the employee to
pay a share of these costs, and the overall expense of the arbitration as
compared to a court proceeding." 25
III. Analysis and Criticism
The court in Armendariz attempted to placate both sides of the
mandatory arbitration debate. On one hand, the court has allowed
employers to continue to use these agreements to protect themselves.
On the other hand, the court has subjected such agreements to in-
114. See id. at 695.
115. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985).
116. See id.
117. CAL. Civ CODE § 1598 (West 1982).
118. See id.
119. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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tense scrutiny. Certain portions of the opinion do not require further
comment, such as the requirement that a neutral arbitrator be
used. 126 Furthermore, many commentators would be in agreement
that allowing an employer to limit employees' statutory rights via a
contract of adhesion likely runs against public policy. 127
A. The Decision
The court's rejection of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield2 s
was necessary to protect employers and uphold the intent of the legis-
lature in drafting the CAA.129 In doing so, the California Supreme
Court has followed most other jurisdictions that have addressed the
issue.' 30 By distinguishing the Gardner-Denver line of cases, which in-
volved the collective bargaining arena, the court in Armendariz cor-
rectly noted a difference where an individual voluntarily enters into
an agreement.
In Armendariz, the employees cited the Dunlop Commission Re-
port' 3 ' to support their point that discovery is necessary in order to
bring a FEHA claim. The court agreed "that adequate discovery is in-
dispensable for the vindication of FEHA claims"1 32 and held
"[a] dequate provisions for discovery are set forth in the CAA at Code
of Civil Procedure section 1283.05, subdivision (a)." 133 The difficulty
126. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.d (discussing neutral arbitrators).
127. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682 ("The principle that an arbitration agreement may
not limit statutorily imposed remedies such as punitive damages and attorneys fees appears
to be undisputed.").
128. See supra note 9.
129. See generally CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-89 (West 1987).
130. See discussion supra Part I.A.
131. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Reported Recom-
mendations (1994) available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/e-archive/govreports/
default.html?page=dunlop%2Fdunlop.
132. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 683.
133. Id. See also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1283.05(a) (West 2001). To the extent pro-
vided in section 1283.1 depositions may be taken and discovery obtained in arbitration
proceedings as follows:
(a) After the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators, the parties to the arbi-
tration shall have the right to take depositions and to obtain discovery regard-
ing the subject matter of the arbitration, and, to that end, to use and exercise
all of the same rights, remedies, and procedures, and be subject to all of the
same duties, liabilities, and obligations in the arbitration with respect to the
subject matter thereof, as provided in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section
1985) of, and Article 3 (commencing with Section 2016) of Chapter 3 of,
Title 3 of Part 4 of this code, as if the subject matter of the arbitration were
pending before a superior court of this state in a civil action other than a
limited civil case.
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is in attempting to reconcile the "desirable simplicity with the require-
ments of the FEHA in determining the appropriate discovery.
13 4
While the court does provide employers with an opportunity to tailor
the agreements to limit discovery, 135 it still provides adequate protec-
tion for employees seeking information, and allows for judicial re-
view. 136 While there exists the potential for abuse on both sides, this
portion of the decision comports with general notions of fairness.
By forcing employers to bear the costs of arbitration, the court
has both placated plaintiffs' attorneys, and placed the burden squarely
on those most able to afford it. Employees will not be dissuaded from
bringing discrimination claims by high costs and smaller awards.
137
Both sides of the debate win on this issue-the employer gets a quick
resolution of the claim in arbitration, and the employee suffers no
greater cost than litigation in a courtroom. Furthermore, the plaintiff
benefits from quick resolution. The requirement of neutral arbitra-
tors, coupled with efforts from the plaintiffs' bar should be sufficient
to avoid any bias by companies seeking repeat defense business.
1 38
The requirement of a written award, which can be subject to judi-
cial review, will ensure that a plaintiffs rights are vindicated. This re-
quirement protects the employer as well. By outlining the basis for its
decision, the employer is provided with information that should help
prevent problems in the future. Furthermore, in backing off from the
overall tone in Moncharsh 39 and sanctioning some judicial review of
arbitration awards, the court has provided ample protection against
unlawful awards.
Finally, by essentially declaring that all agreements that are not
binding on both parties are unlawful 140 and not subject to sever-
ance,141 the court has laid down a fairly bright line test by which em-
ployers may review their existing agreements. Employers will know the
court has the option of either severing the unconscionable terms or
invalidating the agreement.' 42 If the arbitration agreement does not
contain the "modicum of bilaterality" then any motion to compel arbi-
134. Id. at 684 n.11.
135. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 686-87.
138. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
139. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 900 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (holding
that generally any substantive review, even where there was an error in law on the face of
the award which resulted in substantial injustice, is barred).
140. See supra text accompanying note 119.
141. See supra text accompanying note 120.
142. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tration must fail. If, however, there are other clauses that could be
severed, the contract must be analyzed to determine if the central pur-
pose is "permeated by an unlawful purpose."'14 3 If it is not, it can be
cured by "severance, restriction or duly authorized reformation.' 1 4 4
This portion of the holding will keep many attorneys busy drafting
subsequent arbitration agreements which bind employers wishing to
arbitrate their disputes.
B. What Needs to Be Done
The two issues the court declined to address, but which may
threaten the validity of mandatory arbitration, are the requirement of
express notice and the judicial standards of review for statutory claims
leading to review of arbitration awards.
1. Review of the Arbitrator's Award
In Moncharsh, the California Supreme Court held that the only
grounds for review of an arbitrator's award were those contained in
the California Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2145 and thus se-
verely limited the ability of a party to seek redress of an award issued
in error. 14 6 While the Armendariz court does attempt to soften this
stance, by quoting its earlier decision suggesting judicial review may
be necessary when the arbitrator's award is inconsistent with a party's
statutory rights, 14 7 the court conveniently ignores its own statement
immediately following: "Without an explicit legislative expression of
public policy, however, courts should be reluctant to invalidate an ar-
bitrator's award on this ground. The reason is clear: the Legislature
has already expressed its strong support for private arbitration and the
finality of arbitral awards .... "148 While this may seem harsh, the
underlying truth is that arbitrators are not bound by the black letter of
143. Id. at 684.
144. Id. at 685.
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West Supp. 2002). The five grounds for overturn-
ing an arbitration award are:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b)
there was corruption in any of the arbitrators; (c) the rights of such party were
prejudiced by misconduct of the neutral arbitrator; (d) the arbitrator exceeded
their powers ... ; (e) the rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the
refusal to postpone ... or by the refusal of the arbitrator to hear evidence mate-
rial ... or by other conduct ... contrary to the provisions of this title. Id.
146. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 923 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
147. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685 (quoting Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 918).
148. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 919.
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the law, instead they decide the cases ex aequo et bono,149 allowing them
to take into account factors that a court may not.150 Based on this
premise, an arbitrator may be able to go outside of traditional eviden-
tiary rules and consider all relevant information in making a decision.
While there may be an occasional mistake, the cost savings by the
avoidance of litigation should make up for such mistakes.
2. Notice of Mandatory Arbitration
The other issue that has yet to be resolved is the type of notice
necessary prior to enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate disputes.
In the case of voluntary arbitration, this is not an issue. However, in
the pre-employment contract stage, this is an issue that could prohibit
the enforcement of an agreement. The Ninth Circuit in Renteria v.
Prudential Insurance Company of America,151 held that the standard for
compelling arbitration is whether the plaintiff made a "knowing
waiver" of his rights to a judicial forum. 152 Furthermore, the provision
must include a clause that the plaintiff is bound to arbitrate Title VII
claims.153 While this holding has been criticized by other courts,
154
the lesson to employers is to include a comprehensive list of all claims
in the agreement.
While the level of notice required has not been expressly de-
cided, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to the level
of notice required. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casaratto,155 the Court
held that the FAA does not require a greater level of notice than any
other provision in a contract. The Montana legislature enacted a stat-
ute which required that an agreement to arbitrate must be placed on
the first page of the contract and the text be underlined. 156 The Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that the statute was not at odds with the
FAA and therefore the agreement was invalid. 157 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, stating:
[The Montana statute] directly conflicts with [section] 2 of the
FAA because the State's law conditions the enforceability of arbitra-
149. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 581 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ex aequo et bono as according
to what is just and good).
150. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d. at 902.
151. 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
152. See id. at 1108.
153. See id.
154. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that nowhere in the FAA does knowing waiver come up).
155. 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996).
156. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4).
157. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684.
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tion agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement
not applicable to contracts generally. The FAA thus displaces the
Montana statute with the respect to arbitration agreements covered
by the Act. 158
Employers should also be careful because some courts of appeal
have followed a different standard for the enforceability of contracts
of adhesion. In Marin Storage & Trucking v. Benco Contracting & Engi-
neering, Inc.,' 59 the court used the alternative set forth in Graham v.
Scissor-Tail 60 where a contract may be denied enforceability if it "frus-
trates the reasonable expectations of the weaker party."'16 In that par-
ticular case, an indemnification clause was upheld as the party to be
bound had entered into hundred of the contracts. 162 This same legal
reasoning could be applied to invalidate an arbitration clause if the
employee is not given adequate notice of the waiver.
The courts will, however, support an employer's decision to re-
quire mandatory arbitration. In Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps,163 the California Court of Appeal for the second district held
that a claim for wrongful termination must involve public policy viola-
tions and that requiring arbitration was not a public policy viola-
tion. 164 Lagatree was a legal secretary who was asked to sign a
mandatory arbitration clause as a condition of continued employ-
ment.165 Declining to do so, he found himself in search of a new job.
When he did find subsequent employment, his new employer also re-
quired that he sign an arbitration agreement. 66 Again declining to do
so, he found himself unemployed. He then brought suit alleging that
his termination was against public policy.' 67 The court of appeal
strongly disagreed, stating "[h]ere, general social policies will be ad-
vanced by not allowing a wrongful termination claim. This is so be-
cause public policy favors the resolution of disputes through
arbitration." 1668 This holding will allow employers to revise their agree-
ments to meet the standards set down in Armendariz and protect em-
ployers from lawsuits when employees refuse to sign.
158. Id. at 687.
159. 107 Cal. Rptr. 645 (2001).
160. 65 P.2d 165 (1981).
161. Id. at 1057.
162. See id. at 1056.
163. 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (1999).
164. See id. at 681.
165. See id. at 667.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 668.
168. Id. at 681.
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Conclusion
Although the decision in Armendariz does provide some protec-
tion for employers, its failure to address the key issue of notice will
leave many employers with existing agreements uncertain. The court
does, however, set standards that employers in California can follow to
evaluate their own agreements. A properly drafted agreement should
defeat challenges and eliminate any potential advantage to be had by
bringing suit in state court. However, with the Moncharsh decision lim-
iting the review of these awards, the court may strictly scrutinize either
the notice given to the employees or the neutrality of the arbitrator if
it seeks a way around the award. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has shown
an affinity for excusing these clauses. Therefore, one must be careful
in drafting these agreements, or a defendant employer may find itself
facing a federal jury trial.
Perhaps the best solution for dealing with existing agreements is
to draft new clauses following the Armendariz formula, and require
that employees read and sign the new agreements. As seen in Lagatree,
the courts will protect employers from suits for wrongful discharge
and any ability to circumvent arbitration can be foreclosed.
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